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Cet article examine les facteurs déterminants la proportion de femmes dans l’entreprise, cette proportion
pouvant affecter de manière significative la différence salariale entre hommes et femmes. Notre recherche
se fonde sur deux perspectives du marché du travail: la discrimination et la coïncidence des besoins entre
entreprises et travailleurs. Nos résultats suggèrent, d’une part, que l’on retrouve une plus grande proportion
de femmes au sein des entreprises lorsque le taux d’emploi est élevé au cours d’une année scolaire et lorsque
le taux de main d’oeuvre disponible est élevé. D’autre part, plus la demande pour un produit est stable, plus
la proportion de cadres sera grande par rapport au petit marché du travail local. Cela suggère qu’une poli-
tique fondée sur un seule de ces perspectives du fonctionnement du marché du travail peut avoir des résul-
tats qui ne vont pas nécessairement améliorer le bien-être des groupes cibles.
This paper examines determinants of the proportion of females in the establishment as this variable can
affect the male-female wage gap in an important way. Our search for the determinants is guided by two
views of the labour market, namely discrimination and coincidence of needs between firms and workers.
Results suggest that establishments have a higher proportion of females when employment is higher during
the school year and employment turnover is higher, the more stable the demand for the output, the higher
the proportion of white-collar employees, and the smaller the local labour market. This suggests that public
policy based on one view of how the labour market works may produce unintended results that will not
necessarily improve the welfare of the very groups targeted.S74 Kevin T. Reilly and Tony S. Wirjanto
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INTRODUCTION
Every employer’s workforce, in all occupational
categories and at all levels of employments shall
reflect the representation of Aboriginal people,
people with disabilities, members of racial mi-
norities and women in the community (Province
of Ontario 1993).
This rescinded piece of public policy made as its
goal the elimination of differences in the composi-
tion, in various demographic dimensions, of the
workforce of employers in the province of Ontario.1
The legislation authorized a monitoring agency with
administrative remedies, including fines, for failure
to submit plans and achieve targets (Kaye 1993).
The coverage was far-reaching since it applied to
the public and all but the smallest private sector
employers. Antecol and Kuhn (1999) estimate that
it would have affected 75 percent of the province’s
labour force.
As public policy this legislation was invasive in
its attempt to modify the outcomes of the labour
market; however, while its scope was unprecedented,
its spirit is not. The federal government under the
1995 Employment Equity Act operates two affirma-
tive action programs. Both programs require firms
to analyze existing sex, race, aboriginal, and dis-
ability composition of their workforces and set goals
for changing this composition. The first program,
introduced in 1978, is the Federal Contractors Pro-
gram. It applies to firms with more than 100 em-
ployees seeking a contract with the federal govern-
ment with a value of more than $200,000 (Canada.
Employment and Immigration Canada 1993; Young
1988). A significant failure to institute changes in
workforce composition can result in a firm being
barred from biding on contracts. The second affirma-
tive action program applies to all employers under
federal jurisdiction with more than 100 employees
(approximately 630,000 employees). A firm found
guilty of repeated violations can be fined up to
$50,000.
The United States federal government has a long-
standing affirmative action program for firms with
which they do business.2 The US program was en-
acted in 1965 by Executive Order 11246 and
amended to include sex as a designated group by
Executive Order 11373 in 1967. Contractors are re-
quired to set goals for changing the demographic
composition of their workforce, and the sanction for
a significant failure is that the company is denied
the right to bid on contracts. The US has no broad-
based affirmative action program; however, it is a
possible remedy that can be imposed on an employer
found guilty of discriminatory practices under Title
VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act (Blau and Ferber
1992, p. 225).3
It is not inaccurate to say that the goal of an af-
firmative action policy is to eliminate gender and
race differences from the workforce of employers
in the economy. In this sense affirmative action can
be viewed as a proactive form of intervention that
explicitly forces employers to change the racial and
gender composition of their workforce in a way
that other policies do not.4 Human Rights Codes
at both the federal and provincial levels ban dis-
crimination in hiring as well as firing and promo-
tion; however, the mechanism depends on individual
complaints which are difficult and expensive to liti-
gate. With economy-wide public policy such as
Human Rights Codes, combined with a substantial
growth in female labour force participation over the
last 30 years the fact remains that we are still ob-
serving gender segregation in occupations and es-
tablishments. The evidence at the occupation level
is well known.5 The evidence at the establishment
level is starting to emerge for both the US and
Canada. In particular, women tend to be
overrepresented in certain establishments while in
others men predominate more than would be ex-
pected. Reilly and Wirjanto (1999) have documented
this for a sample of establishments in the Maritime
provinces while for the US, Carrington and Troske
(1995, 1998b) report a similar pattern in manufac-
turing.The Proportion of Females in the Establishment S75
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The results on gender sorting at the occupational
level and its effect on the male-female wage gap
provided an impetus to governments to implement
pay equity or comparable worth programs; however,
gender sorting at the establishment level represents
a significant constraint on this public policy.6 Pay
equity is based on comparing male-dominated oc-
cupations in an establishment with female-
dominated occupations in the same establishment
using a job-evaluation scheme. Employers are then
required to adjust the wages of the gender-dominated
occupations that provide a similar value to the em-
ployer but are found to have different pay structures.
The lack of gender-dominated comparison occupa-
tions within a given establishment represents a bar-
rier to the implementation of pay equity since a sig-
nificant proportion of establishments will lack the
minimum two opposite gender-dominated occupa-
tions that are necessary for the comparison. This
suggests that gender sorting across establishments
will reduce pay equity’s effectiveness in closing the
wage gap between males and females.
Besides the constraint on a pay equity policy a
question arises as to whether sorting by gender at
the establishment level has any effect on the male-
female wage gap. Reilly and Wirjanto (1999) and
Carrington and Troske (1995, 1998b) document that
the effect of this sorting is to widen the male-female
wage gap.7 This suggests that in changing the ob-
served outcomes that females have achieved in the
labour market, policymakers might want to address
this type of sorting first.
The next section briefly reviews the results in
Reilly and Wirjanto (1999) on gender sorting at the
establishment level and its effect on the male-female
wage gap, and presents new evidence at the estab-
lishment level of the negative effect of this sorting
on the average establishment wage. The effect of
the gender distribution across establishments on the
male-female wage gap can be viewed as an imper-
fect measure of the welfare implications of such a
sorting and can be used as a justification for an
affirmative action policy.8 To provide an estimate
of the possible improvement that can be obtained
from such a policy we use a new method of wage-
gap decomposition developed by Reilly (1999) and
the analysis suggests that affirmative action could
yield a 9-percent reduction in the male-female wage
gap.
Given the stylized facts and the possible gains
from a policy intervention, the next step in the analy-
sis is to look at the determinants of the gender dis-
tribution across establishments. Simple economic
models of discrimination (e.g., Arrow 1985b; Becker
1971; or Bergman 1974) predict that if discrimina-
tory behaviour is present, then sorting by gender
should be observable in the establishment data and
it will widen the male-female wage gap. The use of
these observed stylized facts to infer that discrimi-
nation is the driving factor is a valid exercise only
when there is no alternative explanation. However,
an alternative exists: firms with a high proportion
of females offer employment contracts to workers
that fit the employment pattern preferred by females.
Workers and establishments have preferences, tech-
nological choices, and constraints that must be ac-
commodated and in this context there exists a coin-
cidence of needs between establishments with a high
proportion of females and female workers. This view
suggests that the gender sorting observed in the data
is a result of an equilibrium process in which a mu-
tually advantageous trade takes place between em-
ployers and workers.
The discrimination and market equilibrium views
present to the policymaker very different options to
pursue. However, one needs evidence on the impor-
tance of these two explanations of the determina-
tion of the gender distribution across establishments.
In the third section, using the General Segmenta-
tion Survey, which is a matched establishment-
worker data set from the Maritime provinces, we
will identify variables that are consistent with the
two views of the process in determining the propor-
tion of females in the establishment. Our resultsS76 Kevin T. Reilly and Tony S. Wirjanto
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show that there exists evidence for both views of
the labour market.
The results suggest that public policy in this area
will be complex. Policies that focus just on labour
market outcomes, such as affirmative action, will
introduce further distortions into the labour market
if it does not take account of the trades made by
firms and workers. This public policy issue is taken
up in the concluding section.
DATA AND WAGE EQUATION RESULTS
Data
The data set is the 1979 wave of the General Seg-
mentation Survey (GSS) and we have information
on 1,463 individuals and the 111 establishments they
work for.9 After imposing missing value restrictions
we have a sample of 941 employees, who usually work
30 or more hours per week, in 86 establishments. There
are 724 males and 217 females in this sample.
Our measure of gender composition in the estab-
lishment is the proportion of females (EFP) which
is the number of full-time employees who are fe-
male divided by the total number of full-time em-
ployees and the average is 0.22 (22 percent). This is
a reasonable estimate for the time period and un-
derlying industrial structure of the GSS. However,
this average hides a substantial amount of hetero-
geneity. Ten establishments have no full-time female
employees while there are nine establishments with
70 percent or more employees who are female. For
females the average EFP is 0.46 while for males this
average is only 0.13. This variation at both the es-
tablishment and individual levels of the data sug-
gests that we need to understand its determinants.
The importance of this discussion will be reinforced
if it can be established that this sorting in the data
has an effect on wages.
Establishment Level Wage Equation Results
Table 1 reports that the average hourly wage
(MEWAGE) in the establishment is $6.34. To
explain the log of MEWAGE we have constructed a
set of independent variables using both individual
and establishment level data and the specification
is similar to the traditional wage equation estimated
using individual data.10 The coefficient on the EFP
variable in this equation is -0.393 and it is statisti-
cally significant. The implied elasticity at the means
of the data is -0.09, which indicates that an 11-
percent increase in the number of females in the es-
tablishment will result in a reduction in the average
establishment wage of 1 percent. This negative ef-
fect on wages of EFP is a prediction of the econo-
mist’s view of discrimination in the labour market.
Individual Wage Equation Results
The female to male wage ratio is 0.66, implying that
at the mean for every dollar a male worker receives
a female will receive only 66 cents.11 This estimate
of the male-female wage gap is consistent with the
results obtained by Baker et al. (1995) using the
1980 Census of Canada. Estimating a standard log
wage equation, making no differentiation for gen-
der of the individual, we find a negative and signifi-
cant effect for EFP on log wages of -0.490.12 This
indicates that there exists a positive wage premium
to having more male colleagues, in spite of the fact
that we have controlled for standard differences in
productive characteristics, and that our establish-
ment level results are not an artefact of aggregation.
Allowing males and females to have different
wage determination processes we find that EFP re-
tains its significant effect on wages: for females the
coefficient is -0.291 and for males it is -0.230. Trans-
lating these coefficients into elasticity terms, the
effect of EFP on wages is more than four times larger
for females (-0.13) than for males (-0.03).13 This
differential effect of EFP implies that it increases
the actual wage gap between males and females by
11 percent, which is not a trivial amount.
To the extent that the sorting by gender at the
establishment level and its effect on the male-
female wage gap are due to discrimination, it suggests
the use of public policy to induce changes. A publicThe Proportion of Females in the Establishment S77
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policy that directly addresses gender segregation in
the establishment is an affirmative action program
that attempts to modify the gender composition ei-
ther through targets or in its extreme form quotas.
Now the question is: how to model the effect on the
wage gap of an affirmative action program? The
Ontario legislation, as the quote in the introduction
makes clear, sets as its goal that there should be one
standard composition for all occupations in the es-
tablishment. This has the implication that we can
ignore occupation and simply impose one standard
on the establishment. The federal government’s 1995
Employment Equity legislation uses similar lan-
guage although it is not as unequivocal as the On-
tario legislation. However, the logic of an affirma-
tive action program is as equivocal as the logic of
the Ontario legislation, in that all occupations should
in the long run conform to a standard gender de-
composition, so we can model its effect as one of
choosing one standard for the establishment and
ignore the occupational dimension. The selection of
the gender composition goal is a free parameter for
an affirmative action program and for expositional
purposes we have selected the mean value of EFP,
0.22 as the standard. To calculate the effect of such
a program we use a result in Reilly (1999), that
shows that the effect of EFP on the log wage gap
can be decomposed as: 14
W  ¯ 
m - W  ¯ 
f   =    X  ¯ 
m b  ˆ 
m - X  ¯ 
f b  ˆ 
f   =   
X  ˜ (  b  ˆ 
m - b 
* )   +    X  ˜ (  b 
* - b  ˆ 
f )   +    (  X  ¯ 
m - X  ˜ )  b  ˆ 
m   +    (  X  ˜ - X  ¯ )  b  ˆ 
f  (1)
where:
W  ¯ 
m - W  ¯ 
f : The gap in mean log wages between
males and females after netting out the
effect of all factors except EFP,
X  ¯ 
m: The average EFP for males,
X  ¯ 
f : The average EFP for females,
b  ˆ 
m : The coefficient on EFP for males,
b  ˆ 
f : The coefficient on EFP for females,
X  ˜ : The average EFP over the Pooled sample,
TABLE 1
Means of Variables for the 86 Establishments
Variable Mean Variable Mean
FTEMP 222.48 P-OCC.MATH 0.045
EFP 0.216 WHITE 0.382
FTTURNO 0.171 CITY 0.337
SCHSURG 0.105 UNION 0.430
IND.PRIM 0.163 COMP 0.558
IND.MAN 0.209 SALPOR 0.342
IND.TRADE 0.209 STABLE1 0.093
IND.SRV 0.221 STABLE2 0.347
IND.OTHER 0.198 STABLE3 0.570
P-OCC.MAN 0.071 YEREQ 5.38
P-OCC.CLER 0.146 WOJEXP 17.98
P-OCC.SALES 0.101 EPMAR 0.714
P-OCC.SERV 0.135 EMYKIDS 0.367
P-OCC.PRIM 0.090 EMEDUC 10.23
P-OCC.PROC 0.235 EMCEXP 16.04
P-OCC.CONS 0.115 EMTEN 7.74
P-OCC.TRAN 0.063 MEWAGE 6.34S78 Kevin T. Reilly and Tony S. Wirjanto
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b
*: The coefficient on EFP from the Pooled sample,
X  ˜ ( b  ˆ 
m - b 
* ) : The Male Coefficient Advantage (MCA),
X  ˜ ( b 
* - b  ˆ 
f ) : The Female Coefficient Disadvantage
(FCDA),
(  X  ¯ 
m - X  ˜ )  b  ˆ 
m : The Male Characteristic Advantage
(MCHA),
(  X  ˜ - X  ¯ 
f )  b  ˆ 
f : The Female Characteristic
Disadvantage (FCHDA).
Equation (1) is referred to as the Complete Decompo-
sition and has four advantage terms that can be inter-
preted in the following way. The first term, MCA,
represents the male advantage in the coefficient on EFP.
This term can be viewed as the male coefficient gain
they have in mean wages as a result of the existing
structure in the labour market. The second term, FCDA,
represents the female disadvantage in the coefficient
on EFP, which is the disadvantage females face under
the existing structure. Summing the two coefficient
terms yields an estimate of the coefficient or discrimi-
nation effect on the log wage gap. The third term is
the male characteristic advantage in the EFP (MCHA)
and the final one is the female characteristic disad-
vantage in EFP (FCHDA). These two terms represent
the (dis)advantage in mean log wages that a group has
because of the existing sorting by gender at the
TABLE 2
The Complete Decomposition and the Effect of Establishment Female Proportion on the Wage Gap
(1)  (2)  (3)
Partial log wage gap  0.102  0.245
Male coefficient advantage (MCA)  0.054  0.529  0.129
(0.019)
Female coefficient disadvantage (FCDA) -0.042 -0.405 -0.099
(0.018)
Total coefficient effect  0.013*  0.123  0.030
(0.030)
Male characteristic advantage (MCHA)  0.017  0.168  0.041
(0.006)
Female characteristic disadvantage (FCHDA)  0.073  0.708  0.173
(0.030)
Total characteristic effect  0.090  0.877  0.215
(0.031)
Notes: Column (1): The estimates of the decomposition terms and the numbers in brackets are their estimated standard
errors. The * indicates that estimate is not significant at 95 percent level of confidence.
Column (2): The proportion of partial wage gap associated with EFP. The partial wage gap is defined as the
implied mean log wage gap after taking out the effect on mean log wages for each sex of all factors which affect
log wages except for the effect of EFP.
Column (3): The proportion of total log wage gap associated with EFP and the components of the Complete
Decomposition.
Source of Calculations: For means, Table C1 of Appendix C and for coefficients, Table D2 of Appendix D.The Proportion of Females in the Establishment S79
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establishment level. Summing the two characteris-
tic effects yields an estimate of the traditional char-
acteristic or productivity effect.
The results of the Complete Decomposition for
EFP are reported in Table 2. The not-surprising im-
plication of the phenomenon of gender sorting at
the establishment level is that it is primarily a char-
acteristic problem when looking at differences in
mean log wages. The sum of the characteristic ad-
vantage terms accounts for 88 percent of the net-
log wage gap while the coefficient effect accounts
for only 12 percent of this gap. If we consider the
effect on the wage gap of an affirmative action pro-
gram as being one that changes mean EFP only, then
the Complete Decomposition implies a reduction in
the log wage gap of 25 percent from 0.418 to 0.316.
For the actual wage gap, this change represents a
9.4 percent reduction. This suggests that an affirma-
tive action program will have a large effect on the
male-female wage gap.
However, embedded in the individual wage equa-
tion results is the important issue of whether or not
the results provide a justification for an affirmative
action program. If we view the cause of the gender
sorting and its effect on the wage gap as a result of
employer discrimination, then Reilly and Wirjanto
(1999) show that a positive coefficient on EFP vari-
able should be obtained in the female-only wage
equation, and not a negative effect.15 This suggests
that before altering the gender distribution across
establishments we should understand its determi-
nants since a simple discrimination interpretation
of the results is not available.
THE EXPLANATION FOR ESTABLISHMENT
FEMALE PROPORTION
Coincidence of Needs: Advantageous Trade
Explanation
An aspect of interest is the variation in the timing
of the labour being supplied and demanded. Estab-
lishments whose demand for labour coincides with
the time period when children are in school allows
them to offer an employment contract that minimizes
child-care costs for the family. Contracts such as
this reduce the coordination problem associated with
a child’s schooling and allow both parents to par-
ticipate in the labour market. Females remain the
primary child-care givers in the family and this sug-
gests that the probability of females accepting such
a contract is higher than males. According to this
view the gender sorting observed in the data is a
result of a child-care “friendly” employment con-
tract. To test this hypothesis we create a dummy
variable (SCHSURG), using the quarterly full-time
employment data in the GSS, coded as one if the
establishment employment in two or more of the
three quarters when children are in school exceeds
employment during the summer holiday quarter of
July to September. Table 1 reports that 11 percent
of the establishments have this employment pattern
over the year, and we expect this to have a positive
and significant effect on EFP.
Establishments with low turnover costs have a lower
incentive to provide constant employment over the year
since the cost of layoffs is lower. One standard exam-
ple of turnover costs, which have the advantage of be-
ing shared by the establishment and the worker, is on-
the-job training. Human Capital theory argues, if the
training is specific, then the establishment and the
worker have an incentive to share the costs. The larger
the investment the higher the turnover costs for both
the firm and workers. Females with their lower labour
force attachment have a lower probability than males
of accepting a contract that requires investment in spe-
cific human capital since this represents a cost to leav-
ing the employer and/or the labour market. This spe-
cific human capital argument suggests that we should
observe a positive relationship between establishment
employment turnover and EFP. We model turnover as
the ratio of full-time hires to full-time employment
(FTTURNO) and Table 1 reports an average of 17 per-
cent per annum in the sample.
A concern with the variables SCHSURG and
FTTURNO are that they proxy industry patterns ofS80 Kevin T. Reilly and Tony S. Wirjanto
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demand that are related to systematic differences in
the industry. The problem is that there are also pat-
terns in the demand for labour across these indus-
tries, so a failure to control for this opens up the
possibility that SCHSURG and FTTURNO are cap-
turing industry effects. We control for the industry
effect by including one-digit level industry dummies
in the equation. The variables, SCHSURG and
FTTURNO, in modelling different dimensions of
variation in the establishment’s demand for labour
suggest that it would be of interest to examine the
demand for females in the context of the ability to
plan its demand for labour. Are establishments with
the ability to plan its demand for labour better able
to deal with the issues associated with female la-
bour supply and hence offer favourable employment
contracts to women? This suggests that we want to
identify a permanent pattern in the firms’ demand
for labour, unfortunately the GSS does not have such
a variable. A good proxy can be obtained with the
stability of the demand for the output of the estab-
lishment that is a precondition for the establish-
ment’s ability to plan its demand for labour. Estab-
lishments in the GSS were asked on a scale of one
to nine to rank the stability of the demand for their
output and we ranked the establishment’s stability
profile using three dummy variables. The highly
unstable demand establishments captured by the
variable STABLE1, average stability demand estab-
lishments have STABLE2 coded as one and the
highly stable output demand dummy variable being
in the category associated with STABLE3. In the
estimation we drop the highly unstable output
dummy STABLE1 so the estimated coefficients are
effects relative to this reference group.
A question is whether employers with high EFP
have a production process that has employment prac-
tices that permit females to accommodate the con-
straint imposed by below school-age children on
labour force participation. What we have in mind is
flexible hours, which allow coordination of work-
ing time between spouses, or an extreme flexibility
in the production process that will accommodate a
last minute no show of the employee. While an
extreme idea, it is interesting to pursue; however,
we do not have a measure of employment rules in
the establishment that the idea suggests we use. Con-
sequently we capture this effect using information
from the worker side of the GSS by calculating the
average number of children 5 years of age or under
of the individuals in the establishment (EMYKIDS).
If these employers offer an extremely flexible em-
ployment contract we expect this to have a positive
sign in explaining the EFP.
Discrimination Explanation
An implication of the standard model of employee
discrimination is that if employers have no taste for
discrimination and have complete flexibility in hir-
ing and firing, then the cost-minimizing choice for
the establishment will result in the hiring of only
males or females (Arrow 1985a, p. 119). The intro-
duction of hiring and firing costs into this model
will result in a distribution of EFP, some segregated
by gender and other firms being integrated, at vary-
ing levels (ibid., p. 124). Further, Becker (1971,
pp. 62-74) argues that a union can be viewed as a
labour market institution that enforces employee
preference for discrimination against a particular
group. So to control for the possibility of employee
discrimination we will use a dummy variable, UN-
ION, which is coded as one if any of the employees
in the establishment have their wages determined
by a collective bargaining process. Given the em-
ployee discrimination argument we expect UNION
to have a negative effect on EFP.
A concern in relation to UNION is that it proxies
the occupational structure of the establishment and
not the effect of employee discrimination. To deal
with this problem we use two control variables. The
first is the proportion of workers who are in the tra-
ditional female occupations in the establishment:
clerical, sales, and services categories (WHITE).
Table 1 reports that the average percentage of em-
ployees in these categories is 38.2.16 The second is
an establishment variable for the proportion of full-
time employees who are salaried, SALPOR and
Table 1 indicates that the average is 34 percent of theThe Proportion of Females in the Establishment S81
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employees are salaried. Both variables capture the
white-blue collar distinction in occupation that is
the most important aspect we wish to control for
separately from UNION.
The occupation variable WHITE is not a pure
“value” free control variable. Bergmann (1974) de-
veloped her theory of the wage gap based on the
observation that discrimination in the labour mar-
ket mainly operates by constraining female occu-
pational choice which results in women being
crowded into a few occupations. This argument sug-
gests that WHITE will capture the effect of crowd-
ing at the establishment level. The coding of WHITE
and the occupational crowding hypothesis suggest
that a positive coefficient on EFP should be obtained.
A standard criticism of the economists’ model of
discrimination, by economists, is that competitive
pressures should in the long-run eliminate the wage
gap because establishments can make extra profits
by hiring women only or, more realistically, as many
women as possible. A way around this is the dis-
criminatory monopsonist hypothesis (Benjamin,
Gunderson and Riddell 1998, p. 143) in which a
discriminating establishment exploits the different
labour supply elasticities of males and females and
still remains profitable. An implication of this model
is that if females have a lower elasticity of labour
supply (reflecting fewer employment opportunities)
than males and if marginal products are equalized
across the sexes then the discriminating monopson-
ist will hire a larger proportion of females. One char-
acteristic generally associated with monopsony is
the size of the local labour market; in particular the
smaller the local labour market, the greater will be
the likelihood that the establishment will have
monopsony power. This simple argument suggests
that in large urban labour markets we should ob-
serve lower EFP with its lower probability of the
employer having monopsony power. We introduce
a dummy variable, CITY, coded one if the estab-
lishment is located in an urban area. A large urban
area is defined as one with more than 60,000 indi-
viduals, which is large for the Maritime provinces.
Our expectation is that if the monopsony argument
is correct then we will obtain a negative parameter
on CITY in the EFP equation.
A concern that can be legitimately raised when
using a variable such as CITY to model the size of
the labour market is that we should consider it in
the context of the size of the establishment itself.
Large establishments in rural areas may have a
monopsony power, but the general store in the same
locality is unlikely to have such a power. For the
monopsony interpretation of the CITY variable to
be valid requires that we control for establishment
size and will do so with the variable FTEMP, the
number of full-time employees in the establishment.
Finally, both Arrow (1985b) and Phelps (1972) ar-
gue that the observed unequal distribution of the
sexes across establishments can be explained by dif-
ferences in perceptions about productivity and re-
quirements for skilled workers. This statistical dis-
crimination model result is based on a number of
assumptions. First, establishments have imperfect
information on the potential productivity of work-
ers. Second, they believe that there exist differences
across definable groups in this potential productiv-
ity. The third assumption is that establishments dif-
fer in their demand for skilled workers; hence, the
requirement to make investments in their workers.
This results in differing needs to screen workers.
Finally, group wages have not adjusted such that the
firm’s return on its investment in the workers is not
equalized across groups. In this model it is hypoth-
esized that establishments will use imperfectly cor-
related measures of workers’ potential productivity
as a screen in hiring. The idea is to obtain a mea-
sure of what the establishment uses to screen
employees and the statistical discrimination story
suggests that firms that use the screen should have
“fewer” females. The measure should be indepen-
dent of the employee’s actual performance and ob-
servable to the establishment prior to hiring. The
variable we use is the minimum number of years of
education required for an individual to obtain per-
manent employment in the establishment (YEREQ).
Table 1 reports that the average number of years isS82 Kevin T. Reilly and Tony S. Wirjanto
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5.38. This low number of years of education required
is generated by 37 establishments that report they
have no such requirement. The average for estab-
lishments which report a requirement, 49 in total, is
a more reasonable nine years of education. The sta-
tistical discrimination theory predicts a negative sign
on YEREQ in explaining EFP.
A potential problem with YEREQ is a possible
bias if we fail to control for actual investments.
Actual investments will be systematically related to
both industry and occupational structure, which are
already controlled for. We will also introduce other
measures of average human capital at the establish-
ment level, weeks of experience required by the
average employee to adequately perform their job
(WOJEXP) and the average tenure in the establish-
ment (EMTEN). These variables should capture the
actual investments being made and minimize the
possibility that YEREQ is picking up an actual pro-
ductivity effect.
Determinants of Establishment Female
Proportion
Table 3 reports the determinants of EFP using two
estimation procedures: ordinary least squares (OLS)
and a two-limit Tobit (TOBIT). The latter recognizes
that EFP is a bounded variable with a lower limit of
zero and an upper limit of one (Maddala 1983,
pp. 151-161), while the former is easier to interpret.
The two sets of results are qualitatively the same in
that differences in parameter estimates are marginal
and yield the same conclusions as to what deter-
mines EFP. The final row of Table 3 reports mea-
sures of goodness of fit and concludes that the re-
gressors are jointly significant at a level greater than
99 percent in both cases.
The two key coincidence-of-needs variables:
SCHSURG and FTTURNO have the correct sign —
positive — and are statistically significant. Both sug-
gest, given our interpretation, that establishments
with the ability to offer employment contracts that
are compatible with constraints faced by females
have significantly higher EFP. In the case of
SCHSURG, peaks in employment coinciding with
the school year have an effect on EFP in the range
of 25 percent. For FTTURNO the implied elastic-
ity, at the means of the data, is 0.18. This is consis-
tent with the hypothesis that establishments and fe-
males have an incentive to make an employment
contract in the context of lower than average spe-
cific human capital investment. These results are
independent of industry since this factor is control-
led for in the specification. SCHSURG and
FTTURNO are strong evidence that part of the ex-
planation of the gender sorting across establishments
is the characteristic of the employment contract of-
fered by an establishment and the demand for these
characteristics by females.
The output stability coefficients (STABLE2 and
STABLE3) results are positive and increasing in
size, indicating that the more stable the demand for
their output the higher the EFP is. Establishments
with stable demand for output and — hence the
demand for labour — are better able to accommo-
date females in employment than establishments
with unstable demand for output. Like SCHSURG
and FTTURNO the results on the output stability
dummies suggest that systematic market-based fac-
tors are driving, in part, the observed gender distri-
bution across establishments.
The only variable that failed to support the coin-
cidence of needs hypothesis is EMYNKIDS. The
point estimate is the wrong sign but at least it is
statistically insignificant. Given the indirect way in
which we are trying to measure flexibility in work
practices in the establishment this result is perhaps
not surprising.
The discrimination variables reported in Table 3
give mixed results but suggest that part of the ex-
planation of the observed gender distribution is dis-
crimination. The WHITE variable is significantly
positive, the proportion of individuals in “tradi-
tional” female occupations helps explain the gender
distribution across establishments. This suggests,
not surprisingly, that the issues of occupational andThe Proportion of Females in the Establishment S83
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establishment segregation are not completely inde-
pendent phenomena. Demand for labour by the es-
tablishment is guided by the occupations necessary
for the production of output; however, as the other
results in Table 3 suggest, this is not the whole story.
The CITY variable indicates establishments in
urban areas have a lower EFP, in the range of 18
percent. The argument for the use of CITY is that
the likelihood of observing discriminating monop-
sonist behaviour is negatively related to the size of
the local labour market and this hypothesis is con-
firmed by the data. Further, it shows that the occu-
pational mix is not the only dimension in which dis-
crimination affects the gender distribution across
establishments. The union dummy variable, UNION,
is insignificant and provides no evidence that em-
ployees use this labour market institution to enforce
TABLE 3
Determinants of the Proportion of Females in the Establishment
Dependent Variable: EFP
Variable OLS TOBIT Variable OLS TOBIT
SCHSURG  0.250***  0.264*** UNION  0.011  0.028
(0.092) (0.066) (0.054) (0.052)
FTTURNO 0.223*  0.233** WHITE  0.350***  0.372***
(0.125) (0.096) (0.077) (0.076)
STABLE2 0.062  0.140* SALPOR -0.100 -0.119
(0.053) (0.082) (0.075) (0.076)
STABLE3  0.106**  0.175** CITY -0.178*** -0.189***
(0.053) (0.080) (0.055) (0.048)
EMYKIDS -0.025 -0.033 FTEMP(*1/100)  0.003  0.003
(0.041) (0.053) (0.005) (0.005)
IND.PRIM -0.019 -0.040 YEREQ  0.006  0.008*
(0.046) (0.069) (0.004) (0.004)
IND.TRADE  0.093  0.111 WOJEXP(*1/10) -0.003 -0.011
(0.076) (0.082) (0.010) (0.010)
IND.SERV  0.096  0.096 EMTEN -0.006 -0.007
(0.069) (0.076) (0.004) (0.005)
IND.OTHER  0.037  0.033 CONSTANT  0.003 -0.074
(0.060) (0.066) (0.069) (0.101)
SIGNIFICANCE F(17,68) c2(17)
=7.85 =86.46
Notes: The numbers in the parentheses are standard error and in the OLS case they are robust standard errors.
* indicates that estimate is significant at 90 percent level of confidence.
** indicates that estimate is significant at 95 percent level of confidence.
*** indicates that estimate is significant at 99 percent level of confidence.S84 Kevin T. Reilly and Tony S. Wirjanto
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discriminatory preferences to reduce the proportion
of females in the establishment. Further, our mea-
sure of the screening of potential employees
(YEREQ) is marginally significant in the case of
the TOBIT estimation. But it has the wrong sign in
terms of the statistical discrimination argument; that
is, we obtain a positive and not the predicted nega-
tive coefficient. This in spite of our controlling for
the occupational structure and actual human capital
investment in the establishment (WOJEXP and
EMTEN). This suggests that imperfect information
on potential workers productivity and heterogene-
ity in the requirement for skilled workers are un-
likely to be the reason why we observe the type of
gender distribution at the establishment level with
this data set.
The conclusion from Table 3 is that there are sig-
nificant determinants of EFP which are consistent
with both the discrimination and labour market equi-
librium explanations of it. It is important to stress
that EFP should not be treated as a “pure” measure
of how the labour market works under just one of
the two hypotheses examined. Rather, the gender
distribution across establishments is being driven by
a multitude of factors and in the conclusion we will
attempt to examine the implications of this new styl-
ized fact.
CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we have reviewed the evidence on gen-
der segregation across establishments and argued
that the existing evidence of its effect on the male-
female wage gap is only partially consistent with a
discrimination explanation. As an alternative to the
discrimination explanation of this distribution we
proposed that firms and workers are making trades
on the characteristics of employment which we la-
belled as the coincidence of needs hypothesis. Con-
sistent with this idea we showed that female-domi-
nated establishments tend to offer employment pat-
terns that are consistent with females’ family respon-
sibilities, have high employment turnover, and a
greater predictability of output demand. However,
we also find that the occupation structure and size
of the local labour market are significant determi-
nants of the underlying establishment gender dis-
tribution and these results are consistent with the
discrimination mechanism.
So, what are the implications of these results?
First, the gender distribution across establishments
is determined by multiple factors which are consis-
tent with two views of the operation of the labour
market. To attribute what we observe solely to dis-
crimination would be limiting, since systematic
factors that are related to the operation of properly
functioning labour markets are, in part, the reason
for the observed gender distribution across estab-
lishments.
Second, from a policy perspective the gender dis-
tribution represents a complex outcome which will
not be amenable to the use of a blunt policy instru-
ment that focuses only on labour market outcomes.
In particular, a policy such as an affirmative action
does not address all the factors that we have identi-
fied in this study as generating gender sorting across
establishments and therefore runs the risk of intro-
ducing other distortions into the labour market. Sin-
gle, focused policies like affirmative action would
be fully justified if we could attribute the observed
gender distribution across establishments solely to
discrimination and that the problem is one of “arti-
ficially” shifted demand and supply curves. Our re-
sults suggest that part of the explanation is that there
are real reasons for the placement of the demand
and supply curves.
Explicitly our results suggest that policymakers
also must address the constraints that establishments
and workers are facing. On the supply side they need
to consider the division of labour in the household,
a constraint we used to justify the introduction of
the equilibrium variables. Demand for the charac-
teristics of the employment contract identified here
is real and will not be addressed by policies that try
to modify the outcomes only. Also, policymakersThe Proportion of Females in the Establishment S85
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need to consider constraints faced by firms; the pat-
tern of employment identified here suggests real
factors are driving the above average demand for
females in certain establishments. If policymakers
choose to try to alter the existing gender distribu-
tion at the establishment level then the issue of con-
straints faced on both the supply and demand sides
of the market must be addressed. We would argue
that our results are suggestive of policies such as
subsidies to firms to smooth employment over the
year and for child care of school-age children if
governments are interested in altering the observed
gender distribution across establishments. However,
this paper does not tell the policymaker the extent
to which these policies would be appropriate. For
this more detailed analysis we require an estimate
of the trade-off in wages for these employment char-
acteristics, which is beyond the scope of the GSS
for reasons discussed in the next paragraph.
Finally, we have shown that it is worthwhile to
move beyond just the coefficient on a wage equa-
tion to examine an issue such as gender segregation
across establishments. Wage equations are reduced
forms and each parameter represents a combination
of underlying supply and demand parameters. For
the policymaker, as well as the labour econometri-
cian, it is impossible to disentangle the driving
forces behind them and this suggests that making
or recommending policy on the basis of these pa-
rameters would not be a sound practice. This con-
clusion is not dissimilar to the one being reached in
the more recent studies on the related issue of occu-
pational segregation (Baker and Fortin 1998;
Macpherson and Hirsch 1995).
In the context of the gender distribution across
establishments we are able to move beyond wage
equation results because of the special nature of the
data set being used: matched worker-establishment
data. With an extremely small data set, which is 20
years old, we were able to obtain results that other
researchers using traditional individual or economy-
wide data are unable to acquire. While many things
have changed radically in the last 20 years since the
data set was collected, we would argue that the la-
bour market experience of females is unlikely to be
one of them and therefore it is our expectation that
the results are reasonably robust in this time dimen-
sion. However, this conclusion will await the analy-
sis of the new matched worker-establishments data
sets that are now being produced in Canada and
many other countries.
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1It was rescinded in December 1995 following a
change of government in Ontario.
2The requirement of these orders apply to contractors
with more than 50 employees and a contract worth more
than $50,000 (Koch and Chizmar 1976, pp. 9-19). For a
complete description of all the main programs see
Stephanopoulos and Edley (1995).
3See Antecol and Kuhn (1999) for a more detailed dis-
cussion of affirmative action legislation in North America.
4See Gunderson (1989) for a discussion of this tradi-
tional type of labour market policy.
5For the Canadian evidence see Baker et al. (1995),
and for the US see Sorensen (1994). For the latest study,S86 Kevin T. Reilly and Tony S. Wirjanto
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which examines both countries on a comparative basis,
see Baker and Fortin (1998).
6Benjamin, Gunderson and Riddell (1998, p. 439) re-
port that all but Alberta and Saskatchewan have some form
of comparable worth or pay equity legislation.
7See also Carrington and Troske (1998a) for a similar
gap-increasing effect of the proportion of African Ameri-
cans on the white-black wage gap in the United States.
8See Blau (1998) for a discussion of the use of wages.
9The sample of establishments excludes those from the
finance and government sector. Quasi-government estab-
lishments such as universities and hospitals are included
in the population and Appendix A provides a further de-
scription of the GSS. The variables used are obtained from
both the individuals and management of the establish-
ment. Appendix B provides variables definitions by level
of aggregation.
10Variables calculated using individual level continu-
ous variables are establishment averages; individual level
dummy variables are proportions of individuals in the
establishment with the characteristic and control variables
at the establishment level (i.e., industry dummies) have
the same value as would appear in the individual wage
equation. A complete set of parameters is reported in Table
D1 of Appendix D. Average data implies that the error
terms are heteroskedastic, so standard error of estimates
are corrected for this.
11Means for all variables used at the individual level
of the data are reported in Table C1 of Appendix C.
12See the Pooled column for all parameter estimates,
in Table D2 of Appendix D.
13In Table D2 of Appendix D the column labelled Male
is for the male-only sample results and the column labelled
Female is for the female-only results. This result on the sign
and relative magnitude of the coefficients is similar to that
observed in the occupational crowding literature which has
motivated the introduction of comparable worth policies by
governments. See Johnson and Solon (1986) for an intro-
duction into the occupational segregation literature and
Macpherson and Hirsch (1995) for the most comprehensive
study. For a sympathetic view of the policy implications and
a review of the numbers see Sorensen (1994). For a discus-
sion of the Canadian experience with comparable worth see
Gunderson and Riddell (1992).
14Equation (1) generalizes the Oaxaca Decomposition
(Oaxaca 1973) which is the standard tool in discrimina-
tion studies (Cain 1986). This innovation builds on the
work of Oaxaca and Ransom (1988) and Neumark (1988)
who derived the Pooled Decomposition and Reilly and
Wirjanto’s (1999) development of the Characteristic De-
composition. The relationship between these decomposi-
tions is that they are all based on fixed-point compari-
sons.
15The logic of this result is straightforward: if firms
do not profit from discrimination then the wage gap be-
tween males and females is a transfer between the two
gender groups. The amount transferred is positively re-
lated to the level of discrimination. However, EFP is nega-
tively related to the level of discrimination. This implies
that the coefficient on EFP in a female-only wage regres-
sion should be positive.
16We experimented with the proportion of individuals
at the one-digit occupation level, but found that they were
highly co-linear with the industry dummies.
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APPENDICES
THE DATA SET AND COMPLETE SET OF RESULTS
A. THE DATA SET
The data set that is used in this paper is the 1970 wave of the General Segmentation Survey (GSS) con-
ducted by the Marginal Work World Program at Dalhousie University. The principal investigators were
Richard Apostle, Donald Clairmont and Lars Osberg. The population base for the sample is non-governmental
establishments in the Maritime provinces of Prince Edward Island, Nova Scotia, and New Brunswick. The
non-governmental criteria exclude from the population establishments directly owned by the government.
The broader public sector establishments, such as universities and hospitals, are included in the population
that is sampled. An establishment itself is defined as a group of individuals at a single workplace under
common management authority. The populations of establishments in the three provinces were identified
using information for the years 1977 and 1978 from Statistics Canada, Monthly Employment, Payroll and
Manhours survey and lists provided by the three-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC). A sample of
697 establishments, which is biased toward large establishments, was generated and 476 in-person inter-
views were conducted with a management representative at the establishment. From this group 118 estab-
lishments, maintaining the sampling structure, were asked to provide a list of their workers. A sample of
2,069 workers was drawn from these lists and telephone surveys were conducted in 1979. This produced
1,513 usable replies. The copy of the data used in this study has 1,463 respondents matched with informa-
tion obtained from the 111 establishments for which they worked. The difference between 1,463 and 1,513
is accounted for by the exclusion of individuals who changed employers between the time their names were
obtained from the establishment and the time the telephone survey was conducted. In 1981 the workers
were re-surveyed and 1163 usable replies were obtained. Establishment responses to a mailed questionnaire
done in 1981 are not part of the copy of the data set used. A complete description of the data set is available
in Apostle, Clairmount and Osberg (1983).
The total number of possible individuals who were eligible for the sample for the study is 1,463, working
for 111 different establishments. Imposing standard non-missing value restrictions on the individual level
variables reduces the number of individuals who could be selected to 1,102. Imposing the restriction that the
individual work, on average, more than 30 hours in the usual week reduces this number to 1,064. Finally, all
individuals whose establishment level information is missing are eliminated, reducing the sample to 941
individuals who work at 86 establishments.
B. VARIABLE DEFINITIONS
(i) Individual Level Variables
WAGE: An estimate of the gross hourly wage. It is calculated using the individual’s response to gross
labour earnings and, when necessary, their response to usual hours per week.
MALE: Dummy variable equal to one if the individual is a male and zero if the individual is a female.
AGE: Current age of the individual, which is year of interview minus year of birth.
EDUC: Years of education, which is derived from a variable coded between 0 and 17.The Proportion of Females in the Establishment S89
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CEXP: Current experience, which is calculated as year of interview minus the year the individual started
their first full-time job after completion of schooling.
TEN: Years of tenure with current employer calculated by subtracting from year of interview the year the
individual started with current employer.
PEINS: Dummy variable coded as one if the individual lives in the provinces of Nova Scotia or Prince
Edward Island.
MAR: Dummy variable coded as one if the individual is married.
NUMSUP: Number of persons the individual supervises. It is coded as one if the individual does not super-
vise anyone.
OCC.MAN: Dummy variable coded as one if the individual’s occupation has a Canadian Classification
Dictionary of Occupation (CCDO) coded between 0 and 4000.
OCC.CLER: Dummy variable coded as one if the individual’s occupation has a CCDO coded between
4100 and 4199.
OCC.SALE: Dummy variable coded as one if the individual’s occupation has a CCDO coded between 5100
and 5199.
OCC.SERV: Dummy variable coded as one if the individual’s occupation has a CCDO coded between 6100
and 6199.
OCC.PRIM: Dummy variable coded as one if the individual’s occupation has a CCDO coded between 7100
and 7199.
OCC.PROC: Dummy variable coded as one if the individual’s occupation has a CCDO coded between
8100 and 8599.
OCC.CONS: Dummy variable coded as one if the individual’s occupation has a CCDO coded between
8700 and 8799.
OCC.TRAN: Dummy variable coded as one if the individual’s occupation has a CCDO coded between
9100 and 9199.
OCC.MATH: Dummy variable coded as one if the individual’s occupation has a CCDO coded between
9300 and 9599.
(ii) Establishment Level Variables
FTEMP: Calculated using answers to quarterly employment in 1978 of salaried and wage-rated employees
whose normal hours per week are more than 30 hours. This is a weighted average, since, if there was no
employment in a given quarter, this quarter did not contribute to the average full-time employment.
EFP: The ratio of full-time employment of women and full-time employment (FTEMP).
FTTURNO: Ratio of the number of full-time hires in 1978 to the average full-time employment in the
establishment, FTEMP.
SCHSURG: Dummy variable coded as one if full-time employment in the establishment in two or more of
the three quarters between the months of October and June is greater than full-time employment during July
to September quarter.S90 Kevin T. Reilly and Tony S. Wirjanto
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IND.PRIM: Dummy variable coded as one if the establishment in which the individual works is classified
as being in the primary industry.
IND.MAN: Dummy variable coded as one if the establishment in which the individual works is classified as
being in the manufacturing industry.
IND.TRADE: Dummy variable coded as one if the establishment in which the individual works is classi-
fied as being in the trade industry.
IND.SERV: Dummy variable coded as one if the establishment in which the individual works is classified
as being in the service industry.
IND.OTHER: Dummy variable coded as one if the establishment in which the individual works is classi-
fied as not being in any of the other categories.
P-OCC.MAN: The proportion of the individuals in the establishment who are classified as OCC.MAN.
P-OCC.CLER: The proportion of the individuals in the establishment who are classified as OCC.CLER.
P-OCC.SALE: The proportion of the individuals in the establishment who are classified as OCC.SALE.
P-OCC.SERV: The proportion of the individuals in the establishment who are classified as OCC.SERV.
P-OCC.PRIM: The proportion of the individuals in the establishment who are classified as OCC.PRIM.
P-OCC.PROC: The proportion of the individuals in the establishment who are classified as OCC.PROC.
P-OCC.CONS: The proportion of the individuals in the establishment who are classified as OCC.CONS.
P-OCC.TRAN: The proportion of the individuals in the establishment who are classified as OCC.TRAN.
P-OCC.MATH: The proportion of the individuals in the establishment who are classified as OCC.MATH.
WHITE: The proportion of the individuals in the establishment who are classified as OCC.CLER,
OCC.SALES and OCC.SERV.
CITY: Dummy variable coded as one if the establishment is located in an area with a population greater
than 60,000 individuals.
UND1: Dummy variable coded as one if the individual works in an establishment that has no employees
whose wages are determined by collective bargaining with union.
UND2: Dummy variable coded as one if the individual works in an establishment in which between 1 and
25 percent of the employees’ wages are determined by collective bargaining with union.
UND3: Dummy variable coded as one if the individual works in an establishment in which between 26 and
50 percent of the employees’ wages are determined by collective bargaining with union.
UND4: Dummy variable coded as one if the individual works in an establishment in which between 51 and
75 percent of the employees’ wages are determined by collective bargaining with union.
UND5: Dummy variable coded as one if the individual works in an establishment in which more than 75
percent of the employees’ wages are determined by collective bargaining with union.
UNION: Dummy variable coded as one if the establishment has any employees it is required to negotiate
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COMP: Dummy variable coded as one if the individual works in an establishment that responded in the
affirmative that they owned or had access to an electronic computer.
SALPOR: The proportion of full-time employees classified by the establishment as salaried (as opposed to
hourly rated).
STABLE1: A dummy variable coded as one if the establishment declared that the demand for its output was
unstable. This variable is based on the following question: “On a scale of 1 to 9, would you say this estab-
lishment faces a demand that is 1=highly stable to 9=highly unstable.” Establishments that responded in the
seven to nine range had this dummy coded as one.
STABLE2: A dummy variable coded as one if the establishment declared the demand for its output was
reasonably stable. For the question outlined in STABLE1 the establishments that responded in the four to
six range had this dummy coded as one.
STABLE3: A dummy variable coded as one if the establishment declared the demand for its output was
reasonably stable. For the question outlined in STABLE1 the establishments that responded in the one to
three range had this dummy coded as one.
YEREQ: Number of the years of education required as a minimum to be hired permanently by the estab-
lishment. This is calculated as weighted average using years required for hourly and salaried positions. The
weights used are based on the number of hourly and salaried employees in the establishment.
WOJEXP: The number of weeks on the job required before most employees adequately perform their job.
The number of weeks’ numbers were collected for office and other workers in the establishment. Then a
weighted average was calculated using the salaried (office) and hourly (other) employment in the
establishment.
EPMAR: The proportion of the individuals in the establishment who reported that they are married. This
variable is calculated at the establishment level using the individuals observed in the establishment and
their response to the marital status question.
EMYKIDS: The mean number of children aged five or under of the employees in the establishment. It is
calculated at the establishment level using the individuals observed in the establishment and their response
to the question about the number of children in this age category.
EMEDUC: The mean years of education of individuals working in the establishment. It is calculated at the
establishment level using the individuals observed in the establishment and their response to the years-of-
education question.
EMCEXP: The mean years of current experience of individuals working in the establishment. It is calcu-
lated at the establishment level using the individuals observed in the establishment and their calculated
years of current experience.
EMTEN: The mean years of tenure with current employers of individuals working in the establishment. It
is calculated at the establishment level using the individuals observed in the establishment and the calcu-
lated years of tenure with current employer.
MEWAGE: The mean hourly wage of individuals working in the establishment. It is calculated at the estab-
lishment level using the individuals observed in the establishment and their calculated hourly wage rate.S92 Kevin T. Reilly and Tony S. Wirjanto
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C. MEANS OF INDIVIDUAL LEVEL VARIABLES
TABLE C1
Means for Individual Level Wage Equation Variables
Variable Pooled Males Females Variable Pooled Males Females
N=941 N=724 N=217 N=941 N=724 N=217
WAGE 6.93 6.93 4.94 NUMSUP 4.01 4.43 2.64
MALE 0.77 1.00 0.00 IND.PRIM 0.21 0.27 0.02
AGE 38.04 38.63 36.06 IND.MAN 0.27 0.25 0.31
EDUC 10.42 10.21 11.10 IND.TRADE 0.15 0.10 0.28
CEXP 17.98 19.03 14.45 IND.SERV 0.20 0.18 0.28
TEN 9.41 10.14 6.99 IND.OTHER 0.17 0.19 0.11
EFP 0.21 0.13 0.46 OCC.MAN 0.10 0.10 0.10
UND1 0.40 0.36 0.52 OCC.CLER 0.15 0.07 0.39
UND2 0.02 0.03 0.01 OCC.SALE 0.08 0.06 0.14
UND3 0.06 0.05 0.10 OCC.SERV 0.09 0.08 0.10
UND4 0.13 0.14 0.12 OCC.PRIM 0.11 0.13 0.01
UND5 0.39 0.42 0.26 OCC.PROC 0.28 0.30 0.22
COMP 0.78 0.76 0.85 OCC.CONS 0.08 0.10 0.01
PEINS 0.57 0.53 0.67 OCC.TRAN 0.65 0.08 0.00
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D. INDIVIDUAL AND ESTABLISHMENT LEVEL WAGE EQUATION RESULTS
TABLE D1
Establishment Level Log Average Wage Determination
Dependent Variable:  Log of MEWAGE
Variable Variable
EFP -0.393* P-OCC.MATH -0.061
(0.118) (0.356)
IND.PRIM  0.056 UNION  0.132*
(0.113) (0.052)
IND.TRADE  0.115 COMP  0.111*
(0.079) (0.042)
IND.SERV  0.210 EPMAR  0.083
(0.129) (0.095)
IND.OTHER  0.111 EMEDUC  0.051*
(0.071) (0.019)
P-OCC.CLER -0.161 EMCEXP  0.023
(0.200) (0.014)
P-OCC.SALES  0.068 SQ.EMCEXP -0.047
(0.221) (*1/100) (0.027)
P-OCC.SERV -0.245 EMTEN  0.010
(0.177) (0.016)
P-OCC.PRIM  0.341 SQ.EMTEN -0.025
(0.246) (*1/1000) (0.040)
P-OCC.PROC  0.100 PEINS -0.110*
(0.230) (0.044)
P-OCC.CONS  0.278 CONSTANT  0.894*
(0.227) (0.377)
P-OCC.TRAN  0.036 R2 0.804
(0.211)
Note: The numbers in the parentheses are robust standard errors and * indicates that estimate is significant at least at
the 95 percent level of confidence.S94 Kevin T. Reilly and Tony S. Wirjanto
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TABLE D2
Individual Level Wage Equation Results
Dependent Variable: Log of Wage
Variable Pooled Males Females Variable Pooled Males Females
EFP -0.490* -0.230* -0.291* COMP  0.077*  0.105*  0.072
(0.071) (0.083) (0.120) (0.033) (0.032) (0.076)
EDUC  0.020*  0.014*  0.049* NUMSUP  0.021*  0.019*  0.013
(0.004) (0.004) (0.009) (*1/10) (0.005) (0.005) (0.010)
CEXP  0.009*  0.007*  0.009 PEINS  -0.082* -0.091* -0.006
(0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.031) (0.030) (0.063)
SQ.CEXP -0.020* -0.018* -0.013 MAR  0.083*  0.107* -0.001
(*1/100) (0.005) (0.006) (0.012) (0.021) (0.027) (0.030)
TEN  0.009*  0.009*  0.025* OCC.CLER -0.316* -0.258* -0.208*
(0.003) (0.003) (0.007) (0.041) (0.055) (0.060)
SQ.TEN -0.012 -0.014 -0.081* OCC.SALE -0.203* -0.156* -0.199*
(*1/100) (0.007) (0.008) (0.025) (0.049) (0.062) (0.071)
UND2  0.103  0.074 -0.211 OCC.SERV -0.394* -0.439* -0.218*
(0.098) (0.089) (0.208) (0.049) (0.057) (0.081)
UND3  0.041 -0.019  0.103 OCC.PRIM -0.099 -0.076* -0.502*
(0.070) (0.068) (0.115) (0.053) (0.057) (0.176)
UND4  0.053  0.034  0.048 OCC.PROC -0.197* -0.184* -0.163
(0.051) (0.047) (0.099) (0.045) (0.051) (0.092)
UND5  0.197*  0.182*  0.148* OCC.CONS -0.076 -0.085 -0.155
(0.036) (0.035) (0.070) (0.051) (0.056) (0.201)
IND.PRIM  0.050  0.031  0.146 OCC.MATH  -0.251* -0.270* -0.171
(0.051) (0.047) (0.147) (0.053) (0.059) (0.112)
IND.TRADE  0.079  0.082 -0.059 OCC.TRAN -0.223* -0.234*  N/A
(0.051) (0.052) (0.092) (0.052) (0.056)
IND.SERV  0.064  0.069 -0.105 CONSTANT  1.597*  1.650  1.079*
(0.054) (0.058) (0.095) (0.088) (0.093) (0.188)
IND.OTHER  0.086  0.071 -0.040 R2  0.533  0.471  0.552
(0.047) (0.045) (0.095)
Note: The numbers in the parentheses are Generalized Least Squares standard errors, * indicates that estimate is
significant at least at the 95 percent level of confidence and N/A indicates no observations in this occupation for this group.